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COMMENT/In Forma Pauperis and the Civil Litigant
Nulli vendemus, nulli negabimus,
aut differemus, rectum vel justiciam.*
The door to the courthouse is always open. The criminal is compelled to
pass through; the civil litigant does so by choice. But once inside, some
voluntary litigants, namely the poor, may find the "open door" illusory-that
a fair trial, axiomatic in America, is often the final step in a long and expen-
sive climb. For that class civil justice appears a luxury when faced with the
need for an attorney, the filing fee, the costs of personal or substituted service
of process, expenses for depositions, witness fees, court reporters and the
like. The array of expenses looks increasingly formidable to a would-be
plaintiff as the realization dawns that if he fails the defendant's costs may
well be assessed against him.
The traditional relief for this problem is the power of the courts to permit
a poor person to proceed without prepayment of costs--"in forma pauperis."
But "without prepayment of costs" usually refers to the official fees of the
court itself. The statutes and the courts are too often silent about the unoffi-
cial costs of civil litigation. For example, in the District of Columbia where
divorce proceedings must be adversary even if uncontested, if a low income
wife seeks to file a complaint for absolute divorce and cannot afford an at-
torney, she may be aided by an attorney from a local legal aid program. A
petition for leave to proceed in forma pauperis may be filed in her behalf. If
the petition is granted, she may have been saved the filing fee but little else. If
the petition is denied, she will have no recourse except to pay the fee. If she
cannot, she will be unable to obtain the divorce. Her attorney can reasonably
argue that her access to the court has been denied because of her poverty and
that she has a right to a divorce if she meets the statutory prerequisites.
This comment will examine the nature of in forma pauperis relief his-
torically and as it exists in the various jurisdictions today. Further, since
the relief provided by in forma pauperis statutes is merely the top of the
iceberg-providing for the waiver of fees and costs on the surface but leaving
the bulk of the problem submersed by not delineating which costs and fees
* "We will sell to none, we will deny to none, we will delay to none, either right
or justice." The Magna Carta, 1 Hen. 3, c. 29, § 2(b) (1225).
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are to be waived-the types of court expenses waived in the various jurisdic-
tions will be examined. The District of Columbia is used as a sample juris-
diction because the problem is more acute there than in any other. The
District not only has an in forma pauperis statute but it has, in its divorce stat-
ute, an anomalous situation which, because of costs over which the courts
have no control, so diminishes the effectiveness of the forma pauperis relief
as to render it practically useless. Lastly, the constitutional implications of a
system which may deny access to the courts to civil litigants are examined
within the framework of the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses.
Justice Douglas has put the problem in the following light:
It is part of the larger problem regarding the inability of indigent
and deprived persons to voice their complaints through the existing
institutional framework, and vividly demonstrates the disparity be-
tween the access of the affluent to the judicial machinery and that
of the poor in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.'
The Origins of In Forma Pauperis
Relief in forma pauperis probably originated with the Magna Carta and its
tenets of basic fairness. Prior to 1495, poor persons were able to prosecute
actions and pursue remedies without prepayment of fees in the courts of
equity, the ecclesiastical courts and before the Council, including the Star
Chamber and the Court of Requests.2 Fees in those days were paid for
services and the issuance of writs necessary to pursue the cause of action,
hence providing incomes for both court officials and judges. It was accepted
that these fees would be waived for those who would take a pauperis oath.
3
In forma pauperis relief was extended to the common law courts in 1495
by a statute4 which entitled paupers to writs without payment and assignment
of counsel without fee. 5 By this time most of the judges sitting in the courts
of both law and equity were salaried; but the clerks were not and as a result
the forma pauperis relief was not popular with them.6 Ownership of assets
1. Williams v. Shaffer, 385 U.S. 1037 (1967) (dissent).
2. See Maguire, Poverty and Civil Litigation, 36 HARV. L. REV. 361, 363-73
(1923). See generally In re Lee, 64 Okla. 310, 168 P. 53 (1917).
3. I F. POLLACK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 195 (2d ed.
1952); see Note, Litigation Costs: The Hidden Barrier to the Indigent, 56 GEO.
L.J. 516, 518 (1968). There is an academic argument whether paupers who were
nonsuited and failed to pay the resulting costs were punished. Some authorities claim
they were whipped, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 832, 842 n.73 (1958), citing 23 Hen. 8, c. 15
(1532), while others claim there was no officer to do the whipping and the whole
theory was "at most a judicial gloss." 31 HARv. L. REV. 485, 486 (1918), citing
Anonymous, 91 Eng. Rep. 433 (K.B. 1697) and Munford v. Pait, 82 Eng. Rep. 1093
(K.B. 1677).
4. 11 Hen. 7, c. 12.
5. 4 W. HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 538 (1924).
6. Most judges were salaried by the 12th century but the clerks remained de-
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valued in excess of five pounds distinguished the affluent from the pan-
per.7 The determination of whether a petitioner was a pauper was made
in open court and it has been suggested that this was a prime reason for the
slow and piecemeal processing of petitions for the privilege.8 Although ex-
tension of the relief was not a panacea for the problem of a poor litigant
facing a plethora of fees and costs, it at least put the remedy at the disposal
of the courts and later had precedential value for the courts of the American
colonies.
The American colonial courts followed the English system of collecting
fees at the commencement of proceedings and seemed to have taken the
forma pauperis proceeding as a necessary appendage to the fee system.9
There is a dearth of early cases on the subject, probably because of the
relative affluence of the colonists and the low court costs. Among the poor
it is likely that few found it expedient to resort to the formal legal processes
and its attendant expenses to redress their grievances.
Technical Requirements
Forma pauperis relief is available to the poor in both civil and criminal pro-
ceedings in most jurisdictions either through express provisions of statute1 °
or through court-developed extensions of the common law." The types of
fees and costs that are waived, however, differ radically among jurisdictions.
In some only the filing fees are forgiven while in more liberal jurisdictions
both fees and costs are waived.1 2 Although there is little question that the
courts have the power to waive their own fees, there has been considerable
controversy over which, if any, of the costs can be forgiven short of a statutory
mandate.' 3 New York, for example, has not only waived all fees paid to
court officials but has also provided that the cost of court reporters and at-
torneys fees be paid from state funds in cases in forma pauperis. 1 4 Recently
pendent on the fees for their services until the mid-nineteenth century. See Note,
Litigation Costs: The Hidden Barrier to the Indigent, 56 GEO. L.J. 516, 518 (1968).
7. Maguire, Poverty and Civil Litigation, 36 HARV. L. REv. 361, 376 (1923).
8. Id. at 378.
9. See, e.g., McClenahan v. Thomas, 6 N.C. 247 (1813); Hickey v. Rhine, 16
Tex. 577 (1856).
10. See statutes listed infra notes 19-23; Bradford v. Southern Ry., 195 U.S. 243
(1904); Harrison v. Stanton, 146 Ind. 366, 45 N.E. 582 (1896); Howe v. Federal
Sur. Co., 161 Okla. 144, 17 P.2d 404 (1932).
11. E.g., Martin v. Superior Court, 176 Cal. 289, 168 P. 135 (1917); Hickey v.
Rhine, 16 Tex. 577 (1856).
12. See generally Annot., 6 A.L.R. 1281 (1920); 20 AM. JtR. 2d Costs § 47
(1965).
13. "Fees" are paid by litigants to officers of the court and are usually prescribed
by statute, while "costs" include all the expenses of litigation. See Goodhart, Costs,
38 YALE L.J. 849 (1929); 27 CALIF. L. REV. 352, 353 n.6 (1939).
14. N.Y. Crv. PRAc. LAW § 1102(a)-(d) (McKinney Supp. 1969).
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a lower New York court expanded that already liberal practice to include the
costs of publication where the defendant in a divorce case could not be
found and the statute required notice for absent defendants. 15 Louisiana,
on the other hand, has taken the stricter view of the waiver of costs beyond
the bare fees paid to court officials. The Louisiana Supreme Court in State
ex rel. Clark v. Hillebrandt,'0 ordered the lower court to waive the fees for
issuance of a subpoena but would not waive the deposit to cover the ex-
penses actually required to secure the attendance of the witnesses.
Proponents of the strict interpretation of in forma pauperis statutes argue
that for the court to extend the relief to auxiliary expenses such as attorneys'
fees, transcript preparation, supersedeas bonds, witness fees, deposition costs,
expert witness fees and the like would open a pandora's box to let out a never
ending stream of costs. 17 There are many costs over which the court has
little or no effective control. Adding to this the inability of the courts to
marshal funds without a legislative appropriation to make payment for a
"necessary service" on behalf of a poor person, the forma pauperis relief
becomes somewhat less than the panacea that it might appear. Argument
against strict interpretation is founded on the Equal Protection Clause of
the Constitution and states simply that no man can be denied access to the
courts through court imposed barriers based on the ability to pay.18
In ruling on forma pauperis petitions courts initially must consider
whether a petitioner meets the jurisdiction's poverty criteria. What consti-
tutes poverty differs among jurisdictions, but generally, statutory worth limits
are low. The Arkansas statute, for example, requires that a petitioner be
worth not over $10.00 excepting wearing apparel for himself and his family
and the matter in issue. 19 Hawaii requires petitioners to be worth less than
15. Jeffreys v. Jeffreys, 58 Misc. 2d 1045, 296 N.Y.S.2d 74 (Sup. Ct. 1968).
16. 244 La. 742, 154 So. 2d 384 (1963).
17. Brief for John Alexander as Amicus Curiae, Jones v. Jones, No. 4866 (D.C. Ct.
App., filed Oct. 31, 1968).
18. Recently attorneys for the Neighborhood Legal Services Program (NLSP) filed
a complaint in the case of Byrd v. Greene, Civil No. 2729-69 (D.D.C., filed Sept. 26,
1969) challenging Rule 5(a) of the Domestic Relations Branch of the District of Colum-
bia Court of General Sessions. That rule requires the plaintiff in an uncontested divorce
case to deposit a $100.00 fee with the clerk of the court before the court will exercise
its power to appoint an attorney pursuant to D.C. CODE § 16-918 (1967), which
requires appointment of an attorney to defend in such a case and makes the plaintiff
responsible for the appointed attorney's fee. Termed "arbitrary, capricious and un-
reasonable" and "an invidious and irrational discrimination" against indigent plaintiffs
who are denied the right to due process of law, NLSP attorneys argue that the rule
"withdraws from each judge the discretionary determination which is necessary to in-
sure due process of law and proper justice" by requiring a deposit of $100.00 with the
court before filing a motion to appoint an attorney for an absent defendant.
19. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 27-402 (1962). The Arkansas statute is reminiscent of
the English statute of a century ago which only considered those who were worth
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$25.00.20 New York has amended its rule which set the standard at $300.00
in cash or available property, not including wearing apparel and furniture for
the applicant and his family, to a more liberal requirement that the petitioner
merely set forth the "amount and sources of his income" so that the court may
decide his need. 21 Where there is no express provision in the statute for the
poverty criterion the decision is left to the court22 which, in turn, devolves to
the opinion of a busy trial judge. Guidance is scarce. Many judges look to
the federal in forma pauperis statute which merely provides that a person
must make "affidavit that he is unable to pay such costs or give security there-
for."' 23  This statute was examined by the Supreme Court in Adkins v. E.I.
duPont de Nemours & Co.2 4 There, Justice Black stated:
We cannot agree with the court below that one must be absolutely
destitute to enjoy the benefit of the statute. . . .To say that no
persons are entitled to the statute's benefits until they have sworn
to contribute to payment of costs, the last dollar they have or can
get, and thus make themselves and their dependents wholly desti-
tute, would be to construe the statute in a way that would throw
its beneficiaries into the category of public charges.
25
Consideration of local conditions should, in the last analysis, be the guideline
for the judge in his decision as to whether the petition in front of him
shows poverty sufficient to waive the fees. Both state and federal govern-
ments publish cost of living and average income levels for most areas in the
United States and it would not be improper for clerks of the courts to be
furnished with such information for the judge's reference.
The second consideration undertaken by the court in deciding whether
to grant forma pauperis relief is the merit of the alleged cause of action.
Here the discretion of the court is much narrower. The federal standard,
for example, allows the judge to dismiss an in forma pauperis petition if he
considers the petitioner's cause of action frivolous or malicious. 26 In Ellis v.
United States27 the Supreme Court held that indigents seeking leave to
less than £5, except for wearing apparel and the matter at issue, poor enough to
proceed in forma pauperis. See Perry v. Walker, 63 Eng. Rep. 396 (Ch. 1844).
20. HAWAII REV. LAWS § 229-8 (1955).
21. N.Y. Civ. PPAc. LAW § 199, as amended, N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW § 1101(a)
(McKinney 1963).
22. E.g., D.C. CODE § 15-712 (1967): "When satisfactory evidence is presented
... that the plaintiff ... is indigent .... " Examples of jurisdictions in which
the decision is left to the trial judge are: COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-1-3 (1963);
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 33, § 5 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1969); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 453.190
(1969); VA. CODE ANN. § 14-180 (1956); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 59-2-1 (1966).
23. 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (1964).
24. 335 U.S. 331 (1948).
25. Id. at 339.
26. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (1964).
27. 356 U.S. 674 (1958).
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appeal in forma pauperis should be granted leave "[u]nless the issues raised
are so frivolous that the appeal would be dismissed in the case of a non-
indigent litigant." 28  The states allow the judges to consider the merits of
each case in the threshold sense of at least determining whether the com-
plaint states a claim upon which relief could be granted.29 In Majors v.
Superior Court,30 the California Supreme Court discussed the discretionary
power of the trial courts to allow in forma pauperis proceedings under that
state's common law: "Its discretion . ..should be exercised with a view
to confine the privilege most strictly to those who, having a substantial right
to enforce or preserve, are absolutely unable otherwise to so do, and who,
once having been admitted to proceed in forma pauperis, diligently pursue
a course free from unreasonable delay or vexatious conduct of any kind."'31
In Forma Pauperis in the Several States
Thirty-four jurisdictions, including the federal government and the District
of Columbia, have set up in forma pauperis relief either through formal
constitutional or statutory provisions or by adherence to common law princi-
ples. The federal in forma pauperis statute3 2 has been repeatedly inter-
preted by the federal courts to be the basis of a privilege rather than a
right.33 Among the states, the in forma pauperis relief has had a mixed
background. Rhode Island, for example, makes it a constitutional right.3 4
The Massachusetts constitution has a similar provision."5 The Oklahoma
Supreme Court, on the other hand, construed a similar provision in that
state's constitution as "[not] intended to guarantee the right to litigate
entirely without expense to the litigants, nor to impose upon the public the
entire burden of the expense of the maintenance of the courts."3
During the years of the development of the common law rule allowing
suits by the poor without the prepayment of costs, the states have been wor-
ried about wholesale invasion of their tribunals by those claiming inability to
28. Id. at 675.
29. E.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-1-3 (1963); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 33, § 5
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1969). See 9 U. FLA. L. REV. 65 (1956).
30. 181 Cal. 270, 184 P. 18 (1919).
31. Id. at 277, 184 P. at 22.
32. 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (1964).
33. Williams v. Field, 394 F.2d 329 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 891 (1968);
Weller v. Dickson, 314 F.2d 598 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 845 (1963);
Morris v. Igoe, 209 F.2d 108 (7th Cir. 1953).
34. R.I. CONST. art. I, § 5. See Lewis v. Smith, 21 R.I. 324, 43 A. 542 (1899);
Spalding v. Bainbridge, 12 R.I. 244 (1879).
35. Mss. CONST. Pt. 1, art. XI.




pay the costs. Indiana rejected any common law right to remit fees in the
case of Hoey v. McCarthy,3 7 in which it was said:
It is manifestly the duty of the courts to see to it that justice is not
allowed to fail, and that no one is denied the opportunity of assert-
ing his rights under the law because he is an object of charity; but
it is equally their duty not to encourage unnecessary and fruitless
litigation, or to allow the public treasury to be opened, merely to
harass persons against whom speculative claims, in which no merit
is apparent, may be asserted.
38
Since California did not have a statute or a constitutional provision for forma
pauperis proceedings, the courts there seemed particularly concerned that
their interpretation of the common law rule not be misconstrued. In Jenkins
v. Superior Court the court warned, "[a]pplications for leave to sue in
forma pauperis are not to be encouraged."'39  A year later the same court
warned that "[t]he right to sue or defend in forma pauperis is of such
nature that, unless it is carefully guarded, it is most susceptible of abuse."
'40
Certain types of actions have been proscribed as not being within the pur-
view of in forma pauperis statutes. Divorce is the one cause of action held
in some state statutes to fall outside the relief of forma pauperis. Ten-
nessee, for instance, does not permit in forma pauperis petitions for actions
for absolute divorce but does allow petitions to waive fees to be filed in
actions for limited divorce. 41 Louisiana and Georgia, however, have com-
pletely ruled out divorce as a cause of action in which a pauper can petition
the court to waive fees.
42
A survey of the in forma pauperis relief among the states is illusory unless
note is taken of the particular "fees and costs" which are waived on behalf
of the indigent petitioner. The term "costs" as used here is an all-inclusive
term which will embrace a number of categories. Probably the two largest
areas at which in forma pauperis relief is aimed are the official court fees
set by the legislature or, through delegation of authority, by the courts and
the auxiliary or incidental costs which are ancillary but necessary to prose-
cute or defend a case and follow it through on appeal. A third area, which
rarely falls within the relief available to paupers, consists of attorneys' fees.
It should be further emphasized here that the costs discussed are those in-
curred in civil litigation only. Criminal costs are often similar but there is a
basic constitutional difference because of the threat of incarceration. 43
37. 124 Ind. 464, 24 N.E. 1038 (1890).
38. Id. at 466, 24 N.E. at 1039.
39. 98 Cal. App. 729, 730, 277 P. 757, 758 (1929).
40. Rucker v. Superior Court, 104 Cal. App. 683, 286 P. 732 (1930).
41. TENN. CODE ANN. § 20-1629 (Supp. 1969).
42. LA. CODE CiV. Pao. ANN. art. 5181 (West 1961); GA. CODE ANN. § 24-3413
(1959).
43. See, e.g., Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
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Costs differ in nomenclature from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and, in fact,
from law office to law office. Costs of a semi-official nature which are
usually collected by clerk's offices include the filing fees for complaints and
motions, marshal fees for service of process, fees for the issuance of sub-
poenas and writs of attachment, for certification of official documents, jury
fees, trial fees, payment for the attendance of a court reporter and the like.
These are the fees which are usually waived by the trial court when a forma
pauperis petition is granted. Whether a successful plaintiff will be required
to compensate the court out of the judgment awarded differs according to
jurisdiction.
44
The auxiliary or incidental costs are ever present in litigation and are neces-
sary for the proper development of the litigant's case. These are the ex-
penses which make the cost of going to court prohibitive for the indigent.
Few poor people today cannot scrape together or borrow the filing fees neces-
sary to initiate civil litigation, 45 but when faced with the prospect of paying
out costs that pyramid as the cause of action gets more complicated or hotly
contested, indigent persons (in fact, many so-called "middle class" persons)
prefer to stay at home and not risk the money. These auxiliary (or "inci-
dental") costs include such things as witness fees, expenses for arranging
the taking of depositions, publication costs, costs of transcribing court
proceedings by court reporters, expert witness fees, fees for special process
servers, costs for investigatory services and for the production of evidence.
Some of these costs may be within the control of the court, at least indirectly,
but several of them are payable to persons wholly unconnected with the court.
Expenses such as costs for investigators and special sorts of evidence, as well
as the copy rate for court reporters in some jurisdictions, and the costs of
depositions are not under the control of the court. Yet without these serv-
ices an indigent litigant may be seriously hampered in the prosecution of his
case. Even those expenses which can be controlled by the court are usually
surrounded with due process problems which preclude their being waived
unless there are funds available to the court to pay for the services rendered
the poor. Probably the best example of auxiliary, yet indispensable, costs
are the publication costs which must be paid in order to satisfy the notice re-
quirements for absent defendants or parties in certain types of in rem pro-
ceedings. Obviously, the due process requirement for notice cannot be
waived. 46 The court can only control the method by which publication is
accomplished. Even then, publication is usually prescribed by statute47 and
44. See generally 20 AM. JuR. 2d Costs § 47 (1965).
45. For instance, the filing fee for a complaint in the Small Claims Branch of the
District of Columbia Court of General Sessions is $1.00.
46. Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
47. See, e.g., D.C. CoE §§ 13-336 to -340 (1967).
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is subject to nothing more than de facto compliance.
When publication is through privately owned publications such as news-
papers and the various law reporter services, the charges for the service are
set by the publishers 4s and cannot be tampered with by the courts. To force
a newspaper to publish a notice without payment would be a patent denial
of property without due process of law. Yet denying an indigent access to
the courts only because of inability to pay the costs of publication smacks
of denial of equal protection of the laws. This problem was dealt with
in New York in Jeffreys v. Jeffreys. 49 A suit was filed by Mrs. Jeffreys
against her husband for abandonment after 14 years of marriage. There
were nine children born to the parties. Mrs. Jeffreys was on public
assistance and thereby qualified to proceed in forma pauperis. Upon her
affidavit that she was unable to locate her husband for purposes of personal
service, her counsel (serving without fee from the Legal Services Program
of the Office of Economic Opportunity) moved to have the court waive the
$300.00 cost of publication. The court considered the New York in forma
pauperis statute and similar statutes in other states and concluded that there
was no authority in the statutes for payment of auxiliary costs such as pub-
lication expenses. The court examined Mrs. Jeffreys' claim to a divorce and
found it "a right of substantial magnitude . . . [because] only through the
courts may redress or relief be obtained." Further, by reasoning that the
only dissolution of marriage was through "due judicial proceeding" which
could not be held unless the defendant was served either in person or by
publication, the court arrived at the conclusion that the publication "hurdle
is an effective barrier to . . .access to the courts." As such, the court held
Mrs. Jeffreys "had been denied the equal protection of the laws guaranteed
to her by the state and federal constitutions." 50  It must be noted however,
that the court in the Jeffreys case had available funds provided by the New
York legislature. 51 Most other courts are not that fortunate. Had the court
in Jeffreys not had a "safety valve" source of funds to tap, it is doubtful
whether the same result would have been reached. The court could only
48. In the District of Columbia the charges range between $0.81 per line in The
Washington Post to $0.50 per line in The Daily Washington Law Reporter.
49. 58 Misc. 2d 1045, 296 N.Y.S.2d 74 (Sup. Ct. 1968); see 37 FOPDHAM L. REV.
661 (1969).
50. 58 Misc. 2d at 1056, 296 N.Y.S.2d at 87. A New Jersey Superior Court re-
cently held that the Equal Protection Clause of the fourteenth amendment forbids
that an indigent wife seeking a divorce who was not required to pay other fees be
required to pay a $60.00 publication fee. The court said: "It becomes a subterfuge
to provide a procedure for indigents to secure divorces and then make relief hinge
upon payment of a cost which the plaintiff is unable to pay." Suber v. Suber, 38
U.S.L.W. 2169 (Aug. 25, 1969).
51. 58 Misc. 2d at 1057, 296 N.Y.S.2d at 88; see Munkelwitz v. Welfare Dep't,
280 Minn. 377, 159 N.W.2d 402 (1968).
1969]
Catholic University Law Review
directly regulate the actual cost of publication through regulations limiting
the number of days required for publication or the number of newspapers
in which the notice must be placed. That this position might be tenuous was
noted at the outset by Judge Sobel when he recognized that the City of New
York was asking for an expanded opinion from him so that the city would
have something upon which to base an appeal in the higher court.
52
Another type of cost which may be only auxiliary as far as an in forma
pauperis statute is concerned, but certainly not auxiliary to a person faced
with the expense, is the attorney's fee. While the court must appoint an
attorney to defend in criminal cases, 53 the same requirement is not present in
civil cases. Several publicly and privately sponsored organizations either
employ or have rosters of volunteer attorneys to help indigent plaintiffs file
and pursue an action. But if a would-be plaintiff who is poor does not
happen to have the benefit of one of these organizations, the court will not
help. He can proceed pro se or stay home. An indigent defendant is in the
same position. If he meets an organization's criteria, a volunteer attorney
may help him defend without fee; if he does not, he can choose not to appear
and possibly suffer a default or he can risk a defense pro se. The
most difficult problem comes in causes of action which, because of a
statutory requirement for appearance of defendant or his counsel before
the case can go forward, cannot be resolved by default. Divorce actions
in the District of Columbia are of this type.
54
If the defendant cannot be served because he cannot be found or does
not choose to appear, a District of Columbia divorce plaintiff must execute
an affidavit to such effect and comply with the statutory provisions for sub-
stituted service by publication. The plaintiff must then provide funds for a
court-appointed attorney to represent the absent defendant in accordance
with the statute. 55 To accomplish this the plaintiff must deposit $100.00 in
advance with the clerk of the court before his motion to appoint an attorney
to defend may be filed. 56 After the motion is filed, the court appoints an
attorney from a list of available counsel maintained by the clerk. When
52. 58 Misc. 2d at 1047, 296 N.Y.S.2d at 77.
53. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
54. D.C. CODE § 16-918 (1967):
In all uncontested divorce cases, and in any other divorce or annulment case
where the court deems it necessary or proper, a disinterested attorney shall be
assigned by the court to enter his appearance for the defendant and actively de-
fend the cause. The attorney shall receive such compensation for his services
as the court determines to be proper, which shall be paid by the parties as the
court directs.
55. Id.
56. The $100.00 fee was set by the judges of the Domestic Relations Branch of the
Court of General Sessions as the minimum payment for appointed attorneys on Jan-
uary 15, 1962 by a memorandum addressed to the Chief Deputy Clerk of that Branch.
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the case is finished the appointed attorney is awarded the $100.00 held on
deposit. Without deposit of the fee, the case remains in a "limbo" status
until the local rules operate to dismiss it for not being at issue.57 It is
obvious that such a requirement puts a poor plaintiff at a disadvantage,
but it is equally clear that the court cannot constitutionally compel counsel
to serve without fee. The rule for prepayment of the fee is a practical solu-
tion to preclude members of the bar from having to pursue successful but
indigent plaintiffs for the fee after entry of judgment. Suggestions that the
court maintain a list of "volunteer" attorneys who would be willing to serve
without fee begin to wear thin when the volume factor is considered. Of
the nearly 4000 actions filed in 1969 in the Domestic Relations Branch of
the District of Columbia Court of General Sessions, the court was asked
to rule on 815 motions for appointment of an attorney by plaintiffs whose
defendant spouse was either absent or unwilling to defend. $81,500 was
accordingly put on deposit to pay appointed counsel. It is reasonable to as-
sume that this requirement for an advance deposit causes a substantial num-
ber of would-be plaintiffs to delay bringing an absolute divorce complaint
until they have accumulated enough for the deposit. Some might be per-
manently precluded from bringing such an action. However, other forms
of relief are available to indigent spouses such as separate maintenance
or a limited divorce which do not require appointed counsel to defend at
the expense of plaintiff. It may be that the problem could be resolved by
the threat of court-enforced separate maintenance forcing the defendant into
court with a retained attorney.
If the court were to begin appointing volunteer attorneys without providing
compensation, the appointments would probably consume so much of those
attorneys' time that they might soon become reluctant to cooperate.5" The
criminal courts in both the United States District Court and the District of
Columbia Court of General Sessions, as well as the Juvenile Court, are con-
stantly making assignments in matters which must have defense counsel by
constitutional mandate. 59 The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit appoints new counsel to brief and perfect the appeal, if any is noted.
It is illusory to analogize the generosity of the bar in providing counsel to
make appellate arguments on behalf of criminal defendants in the rarefied
atmosphere of a Circuit Court of Appeals with the probable availability of
57. D.C. CT. GEN. SESS. (DoM. REL.) R. 13.
58. See Ryan, The Lawyer's Albatross-Giving Free Time, 35 D.C.B.J. 32 (Aug.-
Oct. 1968). Judge Ryan suggests that appointed or donated time of attorneys should
be made deductible as a charitable contribution under INT. REv. CODE of 1954,
§ 170(c) (1).
59. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); Gideon v. Wain-
wright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
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counsel to defend in a divorce case which is a voluntary civil action. Crim-
inal defense appointments are compensated under the Criminal Justice Act
which allows up to $500.00 per case to appointed counsel. 60  There
is no legislative appropriation for appointment of attorneys in civil actions.
The legal profession is the only one which expects its members to work
for nothing.6 '
The volunteer list proposal is further blunted by the fact that many of the
attorneys who would naturally be called upon by the court to defend are
the very ones bringing the action on behalf of an indigent plaintiff-usually
on a petition in forma pauperis. Organizations furnishing legal advice and
services to the poor are largely staffed by volunteer attorneys who would
most probably be the same ones appearing on any volunteer list. To pre-
clude any suggestion of collusion or breach of legal ethics, the Neighborhood
Legal Services Program and the Legal Aid Society, two of the primary sources
of legal aid to the poor in the District, have customarily refused to permit
their attorneys to represent both sides of a case.
If the District of Columbia statute 2 were construed to require that the
court appoint uncompensated counsel in divorce cases involving indigent
plaintiffs, there is a possibility that there would be a constitutional impedi-
ment. In Bedford v. Salt Lake County,63 the Utah Supreme Court considered
a state statute which required the appointment by the court of defense coun-
sel in proceedings to have a defendant involuntarily hospitalized as mentally
incompetent. Finding that the requirement for the services of an attorney
without a provision for his fee constituted an unconstitutional taking of prop-
erty without due process of law, the court said:
Until the legislature provides a method by which a lawyer can be
paid for compulsory services to an indigent person, a statute re-
quiring such services is unconstitutional as requiring one to give
services (a form of property) without just compensation being paid
therefor. It matters not that the service is to be rendered to one
other than the state. It would still be an involuntary taking by
the state.
The statute . . . cannot be sustained. . . . If and when the
legislature feels that counsel must be appointed other than at the
60. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (1964).
61. In 1967, Judge (now Chief Justice) Burger wrote: "historically professions have
differed from other honorable pursuits such as that of the grocer, the bricklayer or
the carpenter, in that a profession lays claim at least to placing duty ahead of private
gain. A profession is expected to enforce high standards of conduct, to share dis-
coveries and learning freely, and to teach young members of the calling." Burger, A
Sick Profession, 27 FED. B.J. 228, 234 (1967).
62. See D.C. CODE § 16-918 (1967).
63. 22 Utah 2d 12, 447 P.2d 193 (1968).
[Vol. XIX: 191
In Forma Pauperis
instance of the judge, then the legislature must provide the means
with which to pay for that service.6 4
The Harris Case
The anomalous situation in the District of Columbia with respect to the
costs and fees waivable through court discretion, 65 the problem of publication
and appointment of an attorney for an absent defendant, and the divorce
statute proscribing divorce by default were all at issue in the case of Harris v.
Harris,6 6 recently decided by the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit.
Helen Harris requested leave of the trial court to file a complaint against
her husband for an absolute divorce without prepayment of the filing fee.
Her petition alleged that because of her poverty she was unable to pay the
$10.00 filing fee necessary to lodge the complaint and further alleged that
she believed she had a substantial claim and would prevail.6 7 In her com-
plaint for an absolute divorce on the ground of voluntary separation for more
than one year without cohabitation 68 she alleged a continuous separation
since 1955. The petition in forma pauperis was denied by the trial judge
without comment. 69 Mrs. Harris' attorneys then filed a petition with the
trial court for permission to proceed on appeal in forma pauperis from the
denial of that same relief at the trial level. Again relief was denied by the
judge who delivered a written opinion setting forth his reasons.70 Noting
that the petitioner did not provide a "financial statement detailing expenses,
as well as income and obligations," the judge refused to find the poverty
necessary to warrant the use of forma pauperis relief, stating inter alia:
Defendant here. . . [is] a resident of the State of Pennsylvania. In
all probability, the court will next be asked to appoint counsel to rep-
resent the defendant. Under court procedure, the party moving
for such appointment is responsible for the attorney's fee of ap-
pointed counsel. Should this petitioner be allowed to proceed in
forma pauperis, the court [will] be faced with the inability to com-
pensate counsel appointed to represent the defendant. The tax-
payers of the District of Columbia in effect are being asked to
64. id. at 15, 447 P.2d at 195.
65. Pursuant to D.C. CODE § 15-712 (1967).
66. No. 22266 (Jan. 14, 1970).
67. Mrs. Harris' petition in forma pauperis stated that she had a take home salary
of $70.00 per week, no savings, real property or automobile and was the sole support of
herself and two children. Brief for Appellant at 2, id.
68. D.C. CODE § 16-904(c) (1967).
69. See unpublished opinion denying leave to proceed in forma pauperis, Harris v.
Harris, Misc. No. 4-68 (D.C. Ct. Gen. Sess., Dom. Rel. Br., June 28, 1968).
70. Harris v. Harris, Misc. No. 4-68 (D.C. Ct Gen. Sess., Dor. Rel. Br., June 28,
1968).
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underwrite the plaintiff's petition as well as this appeal. We are
not presented here with the horrible situation where possibly dis-
cretion ought to be exercised to allow relief because a hostile situa-
tion exists which is detrimental to the health of the petitioner, as
well as the children. Here the parties have created a situation by
their own act. They separated voluntarily. The taxpayers of the
District of Columbia did not ask these two people to get married.
They did not ask them to separate. They should not be made to
underwrite the legal procedures to terminate the relationship.
71
The trial court decision was appealed to the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals and that court, in a brief order, held that waiver of prepayment of
costs was within the discretion of the trial court and that the tendered record
disclosed no plain abuse of discretion. 72 The United States Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed and remanded the case
with orders that Mrs. Harris be permitted to proceed in forma pauperis. 73
Mrs. Harris attacked the lower court decision and its affirmance on four
fronts: that the applicable in forma pauperis statute does not exclude divorce
from its coverage; 74 that the trial court erred in the factual determination that
Mrs. Harris was not poor enough to warrant exercise of its discretion in allow-
ing her to proceed; 75 that Mrs. Harris was denied equal protection of the
laws, the courts effectively having denied the remedy of a divorce by the
imposition of substantial costs; 76 and finally, that effective relief for the poor
demands that the circuit court rule on the right to waiver of counsel fees and
publication costs in addition to the filing fees. 77 The brief filed by the
American Civil Liberties Union as amicus curiae went further and ar-
gued that there is a constitutional right to proceed in forma pauperis in divorce
cases if the circumstances warrant it and that the District's forma pauperis
statute was unconstitutional as applied to the appellant; it allowed the trial
judge, in his discretion, to deny her equal protection of the laws. 78
The counter-argument by the attorney appointed by the court to represent
the position of the appellee was that in passing on in forma pauperis petitions,
the trial court must use sound discretion 79 and one of the elements of that
discretionary judgment is that of the public policy of the jurisdiction which
had been found by higher courts to disfavor divorce.80 Further, appellee
71. Id. at 1-2.
72. Harris v. Harris, No. 3888 (Aug. 6, 1968).
73. Harris v. Harris, No. 22266 (Jan. 14, 1970).
74. Brief for Appellant at 9, id.
75. Id. at 21.
76. Id. at 28.
77. Id. at 41.
78. Id. Brief for ACLU at 8, 11.
79. Id. Brief for Appellee at 8.
80. Id. at 11, citing Gage v. Gage, 89 F. Supp. 987 (D.D.C. 1950).
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examined the constitutional issue and argued that the constitutional guarantee
of equal protection of the laws has never been extended to all civil litigation
and particularly not to divorce litigation."' With regard to appointment of
counsel and the publication costs, the argument was tendered that neither
can be waived by the court, nor can the court order payment of public funds
to satisfy those requirements when no such funds exist. It was advanced that
determinations which involve the expenditure of funds from the public treas-
ury are for the legislature.8
2
In finding for Mrs. Harris, the circuit court first held that the proper test
for poverty under the District's forma pauperis statute is the same as the
test under the federal statute,8 3 that the pauper's relief "is not limited to
those who are public charges or absolutely destitute. '8 4 The court further
noted that in forma pauperis relief should extend to the "full range of civil
remedies . . .including what appear to be meritorious cases for divorce,"8 5
and held that the trial judge cannot, by use of a public policy argument (to
require a showing of a useful social purpose), set up more restrictive grounds
for divorce than are prescribed by the statute. Once the pauper meets the
bare statutory requirements for divorce, he is entitled to that relief regardless
of his ability to pay the costs.86 Except for a passing nod to the ACLU's
equal protection argument, the court side-stepped any constitutional question
and decided that the right to divorce in the District has a basis in statute,
regardless of any constitutional right.
The court evidently foresaw further litigation challenging the practice of
prepayment of court-appointed attorneys' fees, interpreted by the lower court
to be required by statute.87 Recognizing that the question had not been
presented on appeal and was "only lurking in the background," the court
nevertheless said: "In indigent cases the court should request members of the
bar of the court to represent such persons on an uncompensated basis."88
This action will significantly increase the appointment load on attorneys who
are already overburdened by appointments from higher courts.8 9 At the time
of the Harris decision, Neighborhood Legal Services Program attorneys es-
timated there were between 500 and 600 in forma pauperis petitions ready
to be filed and that a conservative estimate of the number projected for
81. Id. at 17.
82. Id. at 35, 36.
83. 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (1964).
84. Harris v. Harris, No. 22266 at 6 (D.C. Cir., Jan. 14, 1970).
85. Id.
86. Id. at 8.
87. See discussion p. 200 supra.
88. No. 22266 at 10.
89. See discussion p. 201 supra.
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filing in the next year will be 1000.90 It is reasonable to assume that a sub-
stantial number of these will have to result in uncompensated attorney ap-
pointments by the court.
Although the court reached out to decide the attorney appointment ques-
tion in Harris, the request of the appellant for a decision on waiver of publi-
cation costs was turned down. Recognizing that the costs of publication
are paid to privately owned newspapers and therefore beyond the direct
control of the courts, the court suggested that lower courts lower the effective
costs in indigent cases by limiting the number of times the notice must ap-
pear and the number of media in which notice must appear.,'
The Boddie Case
A similar, but distinguishable, situation was faced by a three-judge United
States district court panel in Connecticut in Boddie v. Connecticut.92 There
a class action was brought against the state by a group of women on state
welfare who claimed that, because of statutory filing fees and other costs
incidental to the obtaining of a divorce in that jurisdiction, they were unable
to obtain divorces and thus had been denied the equal protection of the laws
guaranteed by the Constitution.98 One reason for distinguishing this case
from cases such as the Harris case in the District of Columbia is the fact that
Connecticut has no in forma pauperis statute and is one of the states where
there has been no extension of the relief through the common law. The
three-judge panel framed the question: "May a state limit access to its civil
courts and particularly in this instance, to its divorce courts, by the require-
ment of a filing fee or other fees which effectively bar persons on relief from
commencing actions therein?" 94
In meeting the plaintiff's argument that a right to a divorce is comparable
to the right of freedom from imprisonment due to unjust conviction and the
right to habeas corpus relief, the court found a basic difference between the
right to freedom from imprisonment and the right to access to civil courts to
adjudicate claims to money or property or to adjust marital status. The
court said:
90. Petition of Amicus Curiae for Rehearing or in the Alternative for an En Banc
Hearing No. 22266. It is estimated that this number of cases would increase the
case load of the Domestic Relations Branch of the Court of General Sessions by 25
percent. See discussion p. 201 supra.
91. No. 22266 at 11.
92. 286 F. Supp. 968 (D. Conn. 1968), prob. juris noted, 395 U.S. 974 (1969)
(No. 1553, 1968 Term; renumbered No. 265, 1969 Term).
93. The filing fee in Connecticut for a divorce was found by the court to be $45.00.




There are distinctions between the cases involving imprisonment,
denial of voting rights and the ordinary civil actions. The relative
importance of the subject with respect to which equality is sought
must. . be taken into account. The right to freedom from unjust
imprisonment and the right of franchise were of particular concern
to the framers of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights and the
post-Civil War amendments. Moreover, in the criminal, habeas
corpus and eviction cases there is some direct. . . action involved,
not present in most private civil actions, a factor which may have
some weight in denying the state a right to discriminate in the first
mentioned type of action by fee requirements. In the ordinary
civil (including divorce) case the state has no such direct partici-
pation, merely providing the judicial machinery for determination
of the disputes.95
The court granted the state's motion to dismiss noting that the state legislature
might be well advised to take measures to provide in forma pauperis relief
to its poorer residents.
The Constitutional Questions
Arguments against the constitutionality of the application of in forma pauperis
statutes such as the one in the District of Columbia can be founded on the
Equal Protection Clause of the fourteenth amendment and the Due Process
Clause of the fifth and fourteenth amendments with some common ground
between the two.
Justice Douglas, in Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections,"" stated for the
majority:
We agree, of course, with Mr. Justice Holmes that the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment "does not enact Mr. Herbert
Spencer's Social Statics" (Lochner v. People of New York, 198
U.S. 45, 75). Likewise, the Equal Protection Clause is not
shackled to the political theory of a particular era. In determining
what lines are unconstitutionally discriminatory, we have never
been confined to . . . a fixed catalogue of what was at a given
time deemed to be the limits of fundamental rights.
Notions of what constitutes equal treatment for purposes of the
Equal Protection Clause do change.
97
But the change to which Mr. Justice Douglas referred has not reached very
far into the field of civil litigation. To be sure the Court has found that due
process and equal protection call for procedures which do not permit dis-
95. Id. at 973.
96. 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
97. Id. at 669.
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crimination on the basis of the ability of a litigant to bear the costs of litigation
when the charge is a criminal one and involves the threat of incarceration. 98
In criminal matters, it is always the "State" or the "People" versus the de-
fendant. With the government as a prosecutor, the court can make certain
that the defendant is afforded every opportunity to defend. If the govern-
ment refuses to let the defendant operate on an even par, the court can
simply refuse to hear the case until the problem is rectified.
For the most part civil litigation is voluntary, at least on the part of the
plaintiff, and the court cannot control the cause of action or the relative
equality of the defendant's ability to operate in an adversary atmosphere.
But equal access to the courts was provided in specific terms in the Civil
Rights Act of 1870,91 and that Act was the impetus for the fourteenth amend-
ment. The Court in Truax v. Corrigan'"° held that equal access to the civil
courts was among the fourteenth amendment's primary objectives: "that they
should have like access to the courts of the country for the protection of their
persons and property, the prevention and redress of wrongs, and the en-
forcement of contracts."''° But it is argued that equal access does not include
equalization of economic conditions-conditions that the courts cannot con-
trol: "A man of means may be able to afford the retention of an expensive,
able counsel not within reach of a poor man's purse. Those are con-
tingencies of life which are hardly within the power, let alone the duty,
of a State to correct or cushion."10 2  The Court, over a strong dissent by
Justice Douglas, has declined a subsequent opportunity to broaden access to
the courts for indigent persons by denying certiorari to a Georgia eviction case
which would have presented the problem head-on.'
0 3
Equal Protection
Can a natural disadvantage become enough of a legal disadvantage to cause
the courts to find constitutional difficulties because of the alleged denial of
equal protection of the laws? The law did not create the condition of pov-
98. Long v. District Court, 385 U.S. 192 (1966) (free transcript for habeas corpus
proceeding); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (right to counsel in state
criminal proceedings); Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708 (1961) (waiver of filing fees in
habeas corpus proceeding); Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959) (waiver of filing fees
in state court criminal appeals); Eskridge v. Washington Prison Bd., 357 U.S. 214
(1958) (application of Griffin retroactively); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956)
(right to transcript in state criminal appeals).
99. Ch. 114, § 16, 16 Stat. 144, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1964).
100. 257 U.S. 312 (1921).
101. Id. at 334, citing Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27 (1885).
102. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 23 (1956) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). See
also Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
103. Williams v. Shaffer, 385 U.S. 1037 (1967) (denying cert. to 222 Ga. 334,
149 S.E.2d 668 (1966)).
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erty and cannot remedy the natural disadvantages that follow from it. But
when a natural disadvantage becomes a legal disadvantage, it is argued, the
law must remove any unnatural barriers which have been raised either
through judicial administration or through legislative enactments. 10 4 The ar-
gument was made in the Harris case that the trial court's denial of the peti-
tion to proceed in forma pauperis had the effect of depriving petitioner of her
statutory right to a divorce under the laws of the District of Columbia and
that such a deprivation further created a discrimination between indigents
and nonindigents, thus denying indigents equal protection of the laws in
violation (in the case of the District) of the fifth amendment.
10 5
Traditionally, equal protection arguments were used to limit the power of
the states to discriminate among its citizens. Equal protection of the law was
a right guaranteed every citizen and the equality cut through to the applic-
tion of those laws as well as the substance. 10 6 But there are natural differ-
ences between groups and natural differences lead to a difference in prob-
lems faced by these groups. "Exact equality is no prerequisite of equal
protection of the laws within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment."'
0 7
The legislature necessarily gives special treatment to a class of citizens
when legislation is aimed directly at their common problem. 0 8 All
legislation is "discriminatory" in this sense. As long as there is a reasonable
relationship to a legitimate governmental purpose, any incidental "discrimina-
tion" is not a denial of equal protection.'0 9 Things different in fact may be
treated differently in law. 110 There is a presumption that any classification
drawn by a legislature is based on reasonableness and if any set of facts can
be found to support the legislative reasoning, the court will assume those
facts were the basis for the classification."' Classifications must be based
on real and substantial distinctions, however, which bear a reasonable and
just relation to the things in respect to which the classification is imposed."
2
It has been suggested that the test to determine if there has been a denial of
equal protection of the laws is one of over-inclusiveness (where the law in-
104. See Note, Litigation Costs: Hidden Barrier to the Indigent, 56 GEo. L.J. 516,
534 (1968).
105. Brief for the ACLU Fund as Amicus Curiae at 7-8, Harris v. Harris, No.
22266 (D.C. Cir., Jan. 14, 1970).
106. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
107. Norvell v. Illinois, 373 U.S. 420, 423 (1963).
108. See, e.g., Atchison, T. & S. F. R.R. v. Matthews 174 U.S. 96 (1899).
109. See Martin v. Walton, 368 U.S. 25 (1961); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S.
535 (1942); Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312 (1921); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S.
356 (1886); Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27 (1885).
110. Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 309 (1966). See generally Goesaert v. Cleary,
335 U.S. 464, 466 (1948).
111. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191 (1964); Lindley v. Natural Carbonic
Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78-79 (1911).
112. Southern Ry. v. Greene, 216 U.S. 400, 417 (1910).
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cludes more than it was designed to) or under-inclusiveness (where the legis-
lation leaves out something or someone who is affected by the problem). 118
In discussing the type of discrimination proscribed by the Equal Protection
Clause, the Supreme Court has brushed aside natural classifications based
on such things as age, fitness, sex, weight and geographic locations," 4 and
concentrated on discrimination which they term "invidious" or "hostile."'"
15
This type of discrimination may be found in a showing of clear and inten-
tional or purposeful discrimination in the unequal application of a statute
fair on its face to those who are entitled to be treated alike. 116 But a classifi-
cation (or barrier, impediment or condition) is not invalid as "hostile" or
"invidious" because of simple inequality-there must be an arbitrariness in-
volved.
17
But when that "simple inequality" causes the deprivation of a right guar-
anteed a citizen by the Constitution, the Court has held that the state has the
responsibility to correct it so as to restore that right. In Griffin v. Illinois1"
the Court faced the question of whether the state had to furnish an indigent
prisoner with a transcript for purposes of appeal when the Illinois statute
required such a transcript to perfect any appeal. The Court found Griffin's
right to a fair trial had been denied by the state's refusal to give him appellate
review without a transcript. The Court said:
Surely no one would contend that either a State or the Federal
Government could constitutionally provide that defendants unable
to pay court costs in advance should be denied the right to plead
not guilty or to defend themselves in court. Such a law would
make the constitutional promise of a fair trial a worthless
thing. . . . In criminal trials a State can no more discriminate on
account of poverty than on account of religion, race, or color.
There can be no equal justice where the kind of a trial a man
gets depends on the amount of money he has. Destitute defend-
ants must be afforded as adequate appellate review as defendants
who have money enough to buy transcripts. 19
113. See Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L.
REV. 341 (1949).
114. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (age); New York ex rel. Bryant
v. Zimmerman, 278 U.S. 63 (1928) (number of members in organization); Ocampo v.
United States, 234 U.S. 91 (1914) (geographic location); Collins v. Texas, 223 U.S.
288 (1912) (fitness for business license); Williams v. Walsh, 222 U.S. 415 (1912)
(effect of time on statute); Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (sex).
115. Norvell v. Illinois, 373 U.S. 420, 422 (1963); Welch v. Henry, 305 U.S. 134
(1938); Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27 (1885).
116. Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1 (1944); see Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356
(1886).
117. International Harvester Co. v. Missouri, 234 U.S. 199 (1914).
118. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
119. Id. at 17, 19.
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With that decision, the Court added a new perspective to equal protection.
States may now be required to alleviate inequalities that are natural and are
not the product of discriminatory policies. 120 There was no arbitrary classi-
fication in Griffin, nor was the statute discriminatory on its face. There was
no "hostile" attempt to apply the statute in a manner calculated to exclude
Griffin. There was simply a state statute, neutral on its face which, when
applied, spotlighted a case where there was accidental inequality. But since
there were sensitive constitutional rights involved, the Court brushed aside
the traditional test of "invidious" or "hostile" discrimination and said, in ef-
fect, that any inequality that results in deprivation of rights will be a violation
of the Equal Protection Clause.
The Griffin decision was a criminal law case. It was ten years before the
Court extended equal protection arguments to the natural inequalities of
wealth, which resulted in alleged deprivations of rights in the civil area. The
Equal Protection Clause has been applied to civil cases frequently 121 but al-
most entirely in the area of a citizen's right to vote. In Harper v. Virginia
Board of Elections,122 the Court found the right to vote was denied some Vir-
ginia citizens because of a state poll tax which applied to everyone and which
was not intentionally discriminatory. The statute was found to violate the
Equal Protection Clause because it denied the basic right to vote because
of the natural barrier of poverty. But it is a long step from the right to vote
to the right to bring civil litigation, such as an action for divorce. Other
rights have been argued to be equal to the right to vote in the eyes of the
Constitution but the Court has declined to rule on them. Such a case was
Hackin v. Arizona 23 in which Justice Douglas wrote a spirited dissent when
the appeal was dismissed for want of a substantial federal question:
[T]he Fourteenth Amendment ensures equal justice for the poor in
in both criminal and civil actions. . . . But to millions of Ameri-
cans who are indigent and ignorant-and often members of minor-
ity groups-these rights are meaningless. . . . They suffer dis-
crimination in housing and employment, are victimized by shady
consumer sales practices, evicted from their homes at the whim of
the landlord, denied welfare payments, and endure domestic strife
without hope of the legal remedies of divorce, maintenance, or
child custody decrees.'
2 4
But the court has refused to find that indigence alone is a source of rights' 25
120. See Note, The Supreme Court, 1955 Term, 70 HRv. L. REV. 83, 127 (1956).
121. See, e.g., Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S.
186 (1962); Bynum v. Connecticut Comm'n on Forfeited Rights, 410 F.2d 173 (2d
Cir. 1969).
122. 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
123. 389 U.S. 143 (1967).
124. Id. at 144-45. See also Williams v. Shaffer, 385 U.S. 1037 (1967).
125. Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 184 (1941) (Jackson, J., concurring).
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and any attempt to do so would probably result in a parade of broken dreams
and blunted opportunities for things a man with $50.00 can do that a man
without $50.00 cannot. It seems quite likely, nevertheless, that the Court
will select more and more cases of the variety suggested by Justice Douglas
in his Hackin dissent because of the challenges directed at state (and
court) fees of various types as they affect the poor.'12  Equal protection will
probably be the basis of any Court decision by which the traditional lines will
be redrawn. As Mr. Justice Douglas warned in Harper, "[n]otions of what




The Due Process Clause of the fourteenth amendment "tends to secure equal-
ity of law in the sense that it makes a required minimum of protection for
every one's right of life, liberty and property .. ".. ,128 Although a more
difficult argument to advance because of lack of precedent, the substantive
due process clauses of the fourteenth and fifth amendments may provide a
surer route to constitutional vindication of the rights of the poor to civil
remedies through the courts. The three theories that have been advanced
by constitutional scholars as having been used by the Court are the absorp-
tion theory, the penumbra theory and the "implicit in ordered liberty" the-
ory.129 Examining each of these briefly to compare the rights of the poor
in the light of past Court interpretations, it is evident that the absorption
theory cannot apply here because that theory suggests the incorporation of
each of the specific guarantees contained in the Bill of Rights under the
mantle of due process as found in the fourteenth amendment. 130 The rights
that are in discussion here are not specifically enumerated in the Bill of
Rights so this theory cannot apply. The penumbra theory broadens the
absorption theory to include other rights with which the state cannot interfere.
Such a right is the right to privacy in the marital relationship as found in
Griswold v. Connecticut' and the right to marry in Loving v. Virginia.182
126. Boddie v. Connecticut, 286 F. Supp. 968 (D. Conn. 1968), prob. juris. noted,
395 U.S. 974 (1969) (No. 1553, 1968 Term; renumbered No. 265, 1969 Term);
Sanks v. Georgia, 225 Ga. 88, 166 S.E.2d 19, prob. juris. noted, 395 U.S. 974
(1969) (No. 1554, 1968 Term; renumbered No. 266, 1969 Term) (posting of bond
in dispossessory warrant proceeding).
127. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 669 (1966).
128. Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 332 (1921).
129. See Note, Discriminations Against the Poor and the Fourteenth Amendment,
81 HARV. L. REV. 435, 438 (1967).
130. See Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 222 (1967); Adamson v. Cali-
fornia, 332 U.S. 46, 74-75 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting).
131. 381 U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965).
132. 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
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This theory may have value, especially as an analogy to the area of divorce.
The third theory is that the state cannot impinge on rights that are implicit
in ordered liberty because those rights are so fundamental. 133 But in the
area of divorce, for instance, it is a difficult transition to make between the
seemingly fundamental right to form basic family associations and the right
to disassociate and break up the family relationship. 13 4 The family break-up
has been declared against public policy by the courts. 3 5 It can hardly be
maintained that the right to a divorce in the face of adverse public policy is
so "fundamental" that the state may not control it both by statute and
through the courts by something as minimal as a fee for the filing of a com-
plaint.
Conclusion
It is not difficult to define the problems of the poor in pursuing their rights
in the civil courts. The expense of civil litigation has made civil justice a
luxury. But it is too simple an answer to poke a finger at the courts and
assert that the injustice can both be identified and remedied there. The
courts are traditionally passive forums and the remedies for every civil in-
justice may not lie with them. The legislatures are the more likely bodies
to implement far-reaching reform. But the interests of the poor are not
always foremost in the mind of legislatures and the poor have neither the
organizational nor financial ability to command the attention that is paid
other causes. It is probable that it will take the Supreme Court to unravel
and resolve this anomaly of civil litigation, but such a decision will necessarily
be restricted to the context under which it is brought and it is likely that the
in forma pauperis remedies (or lack of them) in the states may be several
years away from Supreme Court scrutiny.
In the meantime, a number of remedies would seem available to both the
courts and the legislatures to ameliorate the problem. The courts, for their
part, should take the initiative to waive or reduce fees which act as barriers
to the pursuit of civil litigation if such fees have been left to their discretion
by the legislature. The judge who must make the crucial decision whether a
person may proceed without cost or at reduced cost should have financial
standards available to him upon which to base his decision. Bar associa-
tions may be the most valuable conduit of ideas both to the court and to
legislative bodies as well as sources for volunteer attorneys and information
for the courts. Any criterion for financial qualification of in forma pauperis
133. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
134. Foster, Marriage: A "Basic Civil Right of Man," 37 FORD-AM L. REv. 51,
52 (1968).
135. See Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190 (1888); Gage v. Gage, 89 F. Supp. 987
(D.D.C. 1950).
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petitioners should be made public although it must be recognized that the
facts and circumstances of each petitioner's financial situation can vary
greatly. Qualified law students might be used on a voluntary basis to assist
in certain types of civil causes of action, saving a poor person the cost of an
attorney.
The legislature, if it does not grant the courts the power to set their own
fees, should consider expressly granting the courts the power to waive fees.
Perhaps the most far-reaching type of remedy that a legislature might imple-
ment is to make funds available for payment of the unofficial costs which
make the expenses add up. These funds could be dispensed in much the
same manner as is done with Criminal Justice Act appropriations. 18 6 If the
American Bar Association or some like body were to work out a model in
forma pauperis statute, many legislatures might be more willing to accept it
rather than hammer out piecemeal efforts of their own.
It is also possible that the in forma pauperis remedy itself may have out-
lived its usefulness. This old English relief has been grafted to a modern
system of civil procedure and remedy. It is submitted that most of the causes
of action to which the poor are party could be solved in a quasi-legal frame-
work which could be regulated by the courts, but which would be free of
charge. Perhaps the system which creates the costs should be modified
to permit causes of action in various civil areas to be pursued without cost
before specialists appointed by the bar or by the court with the right to
appeal to a court of law.
One of the first steps in providing a solution to a problem is to define its
boundaries. Once it is realized that payment of incidental costs is a very
real part of the relief that forma pauperis is supposed to provide, a long step
has been taken toward that axiomatic fair trial.
Timothy M. Biddle
136. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (1964).
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